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abstract.  In 1944, the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States upheld President Roo-
sevelt’s executive order initiating the mass removal and incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Ameri-
cans on falsified claims of group disloyalty. In the ensuing decades, some courts and scholars have 
cited Korematsu as precedent for extreme judicial deference when reviewing sweeping restrictions 
of civil liberties defended as national security measures. In sharp contrast, others have highlighted 
the World War II-era decision as a cautionary tale about the harm to vulnerable minorities and the 
damage to American democracy that can occur when the judiciary abandons its role as a guardian 
of fundamental liberties. To these commentators, Korematsu’s principle of exceeding judicial pas-
sivity is a “loaded weapon,” ready for the hands of future overzealous or unscrupulous government 
leaders. 
 Seventy-five years later, Korematsu remains startlingly significant, especially after the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 ruling in Trump v. Hawaii that repudiated a key part of Korematsu (mass racial incar-
ceration) while replicating another key part (extreme judicial deference). This significance is high-
lighted by a pressing question for a constitutional democracy both concerned about national secu-
rity and committed to the rule of law: what will happen when those detained, harassed, or 
discriminated against in the name of national security turn to the courts for legal protection? This 
Essay refracts this question through the lens of Korematsu and its 1984 coram nobis reopening, 
examining how courts will—and should—respond to the dual needs to promote national security 
and protect fundamental democratic liberties. 
introduction 
2019 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Korematsu v. United States.1 In that case, the Court upheld President Roosevelt’s 
1942 executive order2 initiating the mass removal and incarceration—often called 
the “internment”—of 120,000 Japanese Americans on falsified claims of group 
 
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
2. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942). 
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disloyalty.3 In the ensuing decades, some courts and policy makers have relied 
on Korematsu, either explicitly or implicitly, as precedent for extreme judicial 
deference when reviewing sweeping restrictions of civil liberties justified in the 
name of national security.4 In sharp contrast, others have highlighted the World 
War II-era decision as a cautionary tale about the harm to vulnerable minorities 
and the damage to American democracy that results when the judiciary 
abandons its role as a guardian of fundamental liberties.5 These commentators 
have characterized Korematsu’s principle of exceeding judicial passivity as a 
 
3. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(observing the Court’s reliance on the existence of an altered military report to justify the 
internment); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (deter-
mining that the government had deliberately misled the Court and finding “manifest injus-
tice”). 
4. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 345 n.30 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“the Court’s holding in Korematsu obviously supports the majority’s analysis, for the Court 
approved a serious infringement of individual liberty without requiring a case-by-case deter-
mination as to whether such an infringement was in fact necessary to effect the Government’s 
compelling interest in national security”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 n.16 
(1952) (citing Korematsu as precedent for deferentially upholding the national security-justi-
fied deportation of legal permanent resident aliens for dangerous political associations); see 
also ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, IN THE SHADOW OF KOREMATSU: DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES AND NA-
TIONAL SECURITY 61 (2018) (describing how courts and policy makers have cited Korematsu 
and its principle of extreme judicial deference in national security settings); David A. Harris, 
On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women, 79 
MO. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (“The post-9/11 climate has transformed the significance of Korematsu 
from a decision that might, in the past, have seemed a mere academic exercise into a standing 
precedent with potentially profound consequences.”); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Intern-
ment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 1001 (2004) (observing the “return of the 
Korematsu mindset”); Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1404-06 
(1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR-
TIME (1998)) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist “does not seem especially troubled” by the 
infringement of civil liberties during wartime); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., “Loaded Weapon” 
Revisited: The Trump Era Import of Justice Jackson’s Warning in Korematsu, 24 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 
(2017) (revisiting the implications of Korematsu in the Trump era).  
5. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945) (char-
acterizing the World War II cases as a civil liberties “disaster”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 
166 (2011) (placing Korematsu in the “Hall of Shame” and proclaiming that “there is no doubt 
that Korematsu belongs on the list of the worst Supreme Court rulings”); Diana Cho, The 
NDAA, AUMF, and Citizens Detained away from the Theater of War: Sounding a Clarion Call for 
a Clear Statement Rule, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927, 955 (2015) (“The Korematsu deci-
sion . . . serves as a compelling reminder of when too much judicial deference to executive 
authority in times of war yields regrettable results that are not easily reversed.”); Jamal 
Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 386-90 (2011) (ranking Korematsu as the fourth 
most-cited case for its “anticanonical” or “antiprecedential” value). 
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dangerous precedent, ready for deployment by overzealous or unscrupulous 
government leaders.6 
In 2014, Justice Scalia reflected this latter view when responding to a 
prescient question about the continued relevance of Korematsu. Justice Scalia 
stated that “Korematsu was wrong . . . . But you are kidding yourself if you think 
the same thing will not happen again . . . .”7 By that time, Korematsu had been 
sorely discredited by judges and scholars,8 but the Court had never formally 
overruled any part of it. When Justice Scalia was then asked how the Court 
would likely rule in a similar case today, he answered by reciting the Latin phrase 
“Inter arma enim silent leges[.] In times of war, the laws fall silent.”9 
As Justice Scalia suggested, judges tend to sacrifice constitutionally protected 
liberties in the face of fears about the nation’s security. Not only do courts allow 
the executive branch to enforce reasonable national security measures; some 
judges turn a blind eye to unfounded or even fabricated security claims, as the 
Korematsu Court did in 1944.10 The laws fall silent, and the vulnerable go 
unprotected. As Justice Scalia emphasized, it could “happen again.” 
Justice Scalia’s response hearkened back to Justice Jackson’s warning in his 
scathing Korematsu dissent. Justice Jackson warned that the Court’s decision in 
Korematsu—which upheld the executive order despite the lack of bona fide proof 
of “[p]ressing public necessity”11—served as a dangerous precedent for future 
violations of civil liberties.12 Korematsu stood as a “loaded weapon,” ready for the 
 
6. See, e.g., David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amend-
ment Protections of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 343 
(1994) (“The danger posed by the deference argument is vividly demonstrated by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Korematsu.”); Harris, supra note 4, at 3 (claiming that “Korematsu 
remains a ‘loaded weapon,’ just as Justice Jackson predicted in his dissent” (quoting Kore-
matsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting))). 
7. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia: Korematsu Was Wrong, but “You Are Kidding Yourself” if You 
Think It Won’t Happen Again, ABA J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/scalia_korematsu_was_wrong_but_you_are_kidding_yourself_if_you 
_think_it_won/ [https://perma.cc/B2N8-CSFW]. 
8. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042-43 (2004); Eric 
L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 586 
(2002). 
9. Ilya Somin, Justice Scalia on Kelo and Korematsu, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 8, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/08/justice 
-scalia-on-kelo-and-korematsu [https://perma.cc/H9G4-BLDQ]. 
10. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 4, at 31 (2017). 
11. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
12. See id. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488822 
masquerading behind a facade of national security 
691 
hands of any government authority who could “bring forward a plausible,” even 
if unfounded, “claim of an urgent need.”13 
Korematsu thus remains startlingly significant—especially after the Court’s 
recent ruling in Trump v. Hawaii,14 upholding President Trump’s 2017 “travel 
ban.” In its ruling, the Court appeared to repudiate Korematsu’s validation of 
mass racial incarceration while replicating its “logic” of unconditional deference 
to the President. As a constitutional democracy both concerned about national 
security and committed to the rule of law, Korematsu’s continuing significance is 
highlighted by a pressing question for the United States: what will happen when 
those detained, harassed, or discriminated against in the name of national 
security—not because of their actions but largely because of race, religion, 
associations, or expressed views—turn to the courts for legal protection? 
This Essay addresses that question through the lens of Korematsu and its 1984 
coram nobis reopening to examine how courts will—and should—respond to the 
dual needs to promote the nation’s security and protect fundamental democratic 
liberties. Part I describes how, in Korematsu, the Court turned a blind eye to the 
executive’s falsified claims of military necessity. Part II addresses the post-9/11 
era and its “chameleonic deployment” of Korematsu15 to either justify or reject 
sweeping ethnicity- and religion-tinged executive actions. Part III charts the civil 
liberties challenges to President Trump’s 2017 executive orders. It assesses the 
Court’s distortion of Korematsu in declaring “wholly inapt”16 the likening of key 
aspects of Korematsu to Trump while upholding the entry ban on those from 
Muslim-majority countries. 
Part IV asks whether, in reviewing restrictions of civil liberties, courts must 
always defer to the executive’s assertions of national security—even if seemingly 
unfounded—or whether, in some situations, they can closely scrutinize those as-
sertions. The themes of the first four Parts coalesce in our conclusion. This clos-
ing Part charts a doctrinal and realpolitik opening for further shaping Kore-
matsu’s legacy: uplifting judicial independence by affirming heightened scrutiny 
as an integral pillar in the edifice of a functioning constitutional democracy. 
 
13. Id. at 246. 
14. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
15. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 51. 
16. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (2018). 
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i .  korematsu  and judicial deference  
The Court in Korematsu validated the removal and, indirectly, the prolonged 
mass imprisonment of mostly American citizens17—without charges, trials, or 
evidence of individual disloyalty—despite the Constitution’s commands of due 
process and equal protection. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
observed in 2015 in a Muslim-American community’s suit against the New York 
police for illegal harassment and surveillance,18 when incarcerated Japanese 
Americans during World War II “pleaded with the courts to uphold their con-
stitutional rights, [the Supreme Court] passively accepted the Government’s 
representations that the use of [racial] classifications was necessary to the na-
tional interest. In doing so, we failed to recognize that the discriminatory treat-
ment of approximately 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry was fueled not by 
military necessity but unfounded fears.”19 
A. Korematsu v. United States 
In 1942, Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui separately 
challenged Executive Order 9066—which was race-neutral on its face—along 
with its implementing military orders that imposed a racial curfew, removal, and 
mass incarceration. The Supreme Court upheld the temporary curfew order in 
Hirabayashi and Yasui in 1943,20 deferring to the President and Congress in their 
exercise of war powers, while delaying a ruling on the far more serious removal 
and confinement orders.21 Nearing the war’s end in December 1944—and with 
almost 90,000 still imprisoned—the Court in Korematsu validated the forced re-
moval of all West Coast persons of Japanese ancestry.22 
 
17. See generally GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF 
JAPANESE AMERICANS (2001) (providing a background history and analysis of the Roosevelt 
administration’s internment policy). 
18. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015). 
19. Id. at 307 (citations omitted). 
20. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
21. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); cf. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) 
(finding that the War Relocation Authority lacked statutory authorization to continue con-
fining innocent Japanese Americans). 
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Justice Black, a former Ku Klux Klan member,23 wrote for the six-member 
majority. He first disclaimed overt prejudice,24 ignoring the blatant racial animus 
conveyed by General John DeWitt in issuing the military orders—including 
General DeWitt’s public explanation that even for American citizens, the “racial 
strains are undiluted” and “a Jap is a Jap.”25 In disclaiming racial prejudice, Jus-
tice Black also ignored the fact that the exclusion orders applied only to persons 
of Japanese ancestry—mostly American citizens—and that the orders applied in-
definitely to every member of the racial group on the West Coast.26 He observed 
that the United States “feared an invasion of our West Coast” by Japan and that 
the military had perceived an urgent need to take “precautionary measures.”27 
But instead of carefully parsing the factual record for threats posed by Japanese 
Americans, Justice Black deferentially accepted the government’s claim that the 
racial group posed the “gravest imminent danger to the public safety,”28 declar-
ing “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and 
of Congress”29 about “pressing public necessity.”30 
B. The Coram Nobis Reopenings 
In 1983, based mainly on the discovery of World War II-era documents, Ko-
rematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui separately filed coram nobis petitions seeking 
to reopen their cases and set aside their convictions for refusing to abide by Gen-
eral DeWitt’s curfew and exclusion orders. All three succeeded.31 The writ of 
coram nobis is a rarely employed common law vehicle for reopening a “mani-
festly unjust” criminal conviction—usually on grounds of egregious 
 
23. See Kat Eschner, This Supreme Court Justice Was a KKK Member, SMITHSONIAN (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/supreme-court-justice-was-kkk-member 
-180962254/ [https://perma.cc/YG5J-VUL7]. 
24. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
25. J.L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942, at 34 
(1943); see also PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELO-
CATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 66 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED] 
(quoting Transcript of Conference between DeWitt and newspapermen (Apr. 14, 1943)). 
26. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. Persons of Italian and German ancestry were not similarly re-
moved and incarcerated as a group. See id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
27. Id. at 223 (majority opinion). 
28. Id. at 218; see infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text. 
29. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. 
30. Id. at 216. 
31. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 
584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Yasui v. United States, No. 83-151-BE (D. Or. Jan 26, 
1984), reprinted in Peggy Nagae, Yasui v. United States: From 1941 to Today—Making the Case 
for the Constitution, OR. STATE BAR (2016). 
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governmental misconduct—where petitioners have served their sentences, and 
they and their community suffer continuing prejudice from the conviction.32 
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui coram nobis reopenings revealed a 
“scandal without precedent in the history of American law.”33 The litigation 
showed that, during World War II, the government had deliberately misled the 
courts and the American public about the ostensible threat posed by Japanese 
Americans, effectively deploying them as scapegoats.34 The War and Justice De-
partments first wrongly intimated that Japanese Americans had committed es-
pionage in support of Japan’s Navy, then falsely asserted that there had been in-
sufficient time to identify and detain the disloyal—and thus that the entire racial 
group had to be locked up.35 
Officials from the War and Justice Departments made this dissembling stick 
by concealing crucial evidence that directly refuted the government’s claim of 
military necessity. The officials intentionally buried the assessments of major in-
telligence services, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), and the Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI).36 Collectively, after thorough investigations, these intelligence services 
had found Japanese Americans to be loyal as a group, cleared them of espionage, 
and recommended against group-based treatment.37 Indeed, FBI Director J. 
 
32. Government misconduct that amounts to “knowingly us[ing] perjured testimony or 
withh[olding] materially favorable evidence” can be grounds for issuing a writ of coram 
nobis. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1981); see YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, 
at 165 n.3 (“The writ aims to eliminate the continuing stigma of a ‘manifestly unjust’ convic-
tion arising out of egregious governmental (usually prosecutorial) misconduct with continu-
ing adverse consequences.”). 
33. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES, 
at viii (1983). 
34. In the Korematsu coram nobis case, Judge Patel found that there would be “manifest injustice” 
to deny relief, determining that the government had deliberately misled the Court. Korematsu, 
584 F. Supp. at 1417. For similar reasons, after a full trial, the Ninth Circuit vacated Hira-
bayashi’s dual convictions for the curfew and exclusion violations. See Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 
at 608. The lower court vacated Yasui’s curfew conviction without a hearing on the merits. 
Yasui v. United States, No. 83-151-BE, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 1984), reprinted in Peggy Nagae, 
Yasui v. United States: From 1941 to Today—Making the Case for the Constitution, OR. STATE 
BAR 5-41 to 5-42 (2016); see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989). 
35. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text. 
36. See KENNETH RINGLE, RINGLE REPORT ON JAPANESE INTERNMENT (1941); Memorandum 
from FCC Comm’r James L. Fly to Att’y Gen. Francis Biddle (Apr. 4, 1944), reprinted in IRONS, 
supra note 34, at 159 [hereinafter Memorandum from Fly to Biddle]; Memorandum from FBI 
Dir. J. Edgar Hoover to Att’y Gen. Francis Biddle (Feb. 2, 1942), reprinted in PERSONAL JUSTICE 
DENIED, supra note 25, at 73 [hereinafter Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle]. 
37. See IRONS, supra note 33, at viii-x; RINGLE, supra note 36 (determining that Japanese Ameri-
cans were loyal in general, and recommending handling disloyalty questions on an individual 
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Edgar Hoover wrote to the U.S. Attorney General that the frantic push for mass 
confinement appeared to be based on politics, not facts.38 But all this crucial ex-
culpatory evidence was deliberately covered up.39 
The Korematsu and Hirabayashi coram nobis litigation also revealed that 
World War II executive branch leaders—including an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, a War Department official, the U.S. Solicitor General, and General 
DeWitt—had helped distort and fabricate pivotal facts. Prior to Hirabayashi, 
DeWitt’s completed and printed final report was recalled and altered to conceal 
its explicitly racist rationale for the mass incarceration and to recite key facts 
about temporal exigency that DeWitt and other officials knew to be false.40 
Justice Department lawyers drafting the government’s Hirabayashi and Ko-
rematsu briefs vehemently protested as a matter of conscience, excoriating their 
 
basis); Memorandum from Fly to Biddle, supra note 36 (directly refuting the DeWitt report’s 
findings of illicit shore-to-ship radio signaling, declaring that “[t]here were no radio signals 
reported to the Commission which could not be identified, or which were unlawful. Like the 
Department of Justice, the Commission knows of no evidence of any elicit radio signaling in 
this area during the period in question”); Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle, supra note 
36 (contradicting the DeWitt report’s espionage findings, stating that “[t]he necessity for 
mass evacuation is based primarily upon public and political pressure rather than on factual 
data”). 
38. See Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle, supra note 36, at 73. 
39. See IRONS, supra note 33, at 205-12 (detailing the “behind-the-scenes” maneuverings to sup-
press critical evidence disproving Japanese American disloyalty or espionage); see also infra 
notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
40. The original completed, printed, and partially distributed DeWitt report recited the actual 
rationale for the mass racial classification. It reported that “it was not that there was insuffi-
cient time in which to make such a determination [of disloyalty]; it was simply that . . . a 
positive determination could not have been made; that an exact separation of the ‘sheep from 
the goats’ was unfeasible.” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 
627 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1986)). The original report revealed that the racial in-
carceration turned not upon temporal exigency but upon the military’s perception that race 
itself predetermined disloyalty. Realizing that the finished report would fully undercut the 
government’s defense of insufficient time to sort out the disloyal individually, the War De-
partment compelled DeWitt to recall the report and, against his objections, to alter it to state 
the opposite of what he originally wrote. The altered version recited that “[n]o ready means 
existed for determining the loyal from the disloyal,” id.,—falsely justifying the mass incarcer-
ation as a temporal exigency and concealing its racist underpinnings. See IRONS, supra note 33, 
at 210. After the alteration, the “War Department tried to destroy all copies of the original 
report” by burning “the galley proofs, galley pages, drafts and memorandum of the original 
report.” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598. The altered DeWitt report was relied on by the Supreme 
Court in Korematsu. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236-37 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (indicating the 
Court’s reliance on the DeWitt report). And Justice Black’s opinion echoed the altered report’s 
key temporal assessment, finding that the “military authorities considered that the need for 
action was great, and time was short.” Id. at 223-24. 
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superiors for the apparent “suppression of evidence”41 and the presentation to 
the courts of “willful historical inaccuracies and intentional falsehoods.”42 The 
principal drafter of the government’s Korematsu brief wrote to the Assistant At-
torney General that “General DeWitt’s report makes flat statements concerning 
radio transmitters and ship-to-shore signaling which are categorically denied by 
the FBI and the Federal Communications Commission. There is no doubt that 
these statements are intentional falsehoods.”43 The government’s lawyer con-
cluded that “[t]here is in fact a contrariety of information and we ought to say 
so” to the Court.44 Nevertheless, the Justice Department ultimately decided not 
to alert the Court to the DeWitt report’s deliberate misstatements about osten-
sible Japanese American espionage.45 
The government never formally submitted into evidence DeWitt’s report 
that set forth the facts supposedly showing Japanese Americans’ imminent dan-
ger to public safety.46 The Justice Department simply asked the Court to take 
judicial notice of the facts recited in this outside-the-record report47—with no 
cross-examination or opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence. As Justice 
Jackson observed in his dissent, 
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in 
necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been taken by this 
or any other court. There is sharp controversy as to the credibility of the 
DeWitt report. So the Court, having no real evidence before it, has no 
 
41. Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, Dep’t of Justice, to 
Charles H. Fahy, Solicitor Gen. (Apr. 30, 1943), https://research.archives.gov/id/296058 
[https://perma.cc/4FK7-LCJ8] (urging the Solicitor General to disclose to the Supreme 
Court the ONI’s investigative report recommending against mass racial treatment). 
42. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410, 1418 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (citing Justice 
Department Director of Alien Enemy Control Edward J. Ennis’s memorandum to Assistant 
Attorney General Herbert Wechsler—as well as a memorandum by Justice Department attor-
ney J.L. Burling to Wechsler—to show that officials expressed concern and were aware of the 
knowingly falsified facts about espionage in DeWitt’s report and urged disclosure to the Su-
preme Court); see also Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 599-604 (describing the deliberate factual mis-
statements in the DeWitt report and the Justice Department’s awareness of and misgivings 
about them). 
43. IRONS, supra note 33, at 285 (quoting the Burling memo). 
44. Memorandum from J.L. Burling to Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler (Sept. 11, 
1944), reprinted in Petition, Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1424. 
45. See IRONS, supra note 33, at 285, 288-92 (noting that the Justice Department rejected the foot-
note Burling inserted into the government’s Korematsu brief to alert the Court to the contra-
dicting intelligence). 
46. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 
44-22). 
47. See id. at 6-7. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488822 
masquerading behind a facade of national security 
697 
choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving state-
ment, untested by any cross-examination . . . .48 
The “sharp controversy” Justice Jackson referred to was sparked by a Har-
per’s Magazine article in which the naval intelligence officer who authored the 
suppressed ONI report, Lieutenant Kenneth Ringle, writing under pseudonym, 
publicly exposed the extensive intelligence undercutting the executive order and 
ensuing military orders.49 In that report, the ONI determined that Japanese 
Americans were loyal as a group, that “the entire ‘Japanese Problem’ has been 
magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical characteris-
tics of the people,” and that Japanese Americans ”should be handled on the basis 
of the individual, regardless of citizenship, and not on a racial basis.”50 When the 
Justices questioned Solicitor General Charles Fahy about DeWitt’s report and 
any contradicting assessments, Fahy replied that the report’s facts justified the 
mass exclusion and incarceration and that “no person in any responsible position 
has ever taken a contrary position.”51 This was a direct misrepresentation to the 
Court—ignoring the unanimous, and then still hidden, ONI, FBI, and FCC as-
sessments and the internal Justice Department lawyers’ protests. In 2011, 
through a rare “Confession of Error,” Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal 
acknowledged that the Solicitor General in Korematsu and Hirabayashi had 
knowingly misled the Court.52 
Despite purporting to undertake the “most rigid scrutiny,”53 the Korematsu 
majority did the opposite. It deferred fully and thereby countenanced the gov-
ernment’s deception. Employing a triple negative, Justice Black wrote that “we 
cannot reject as unfounded” the government’s claim that “disloyal members of 
that population . . . could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”54 The Third 
 
48. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
49. See generally IRONS, supra note 33, at 202-03 (discussing the Harper’s Magazine article); sources 
cited supra note 36. 
50. IRONS, supra note 33, at 203; see Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle, supra note 36, at 73 
(Hoover advising Biddle that “[t]he necessity for mass evacuation is based primarily upon 
public and political pressure rather than on factual data” of Japanese American espionage or 
acts of disloyalty). 
51. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 6-7. 
52. See Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-Amer-
ican Internment Cases, JUST. BLOG (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog
/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases 
[https://perma.cc/K5N3-TXNT]; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Su-
preme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019). 
53. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
54. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
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Circuit in 2015 aptly characterized the Korematsu Court’s logic—its extreme pas-
sivity—as “unconditional deference” to the government.55 
In 1984, after finding “manifest injustice,” U.S. District Judge Patel granted 
Korematsu’s coram nobis petition.56 In an effort to cleanse a judicial record in-
fected by egregious unethical misconduct, Judge Patel vacated Korematsu’s 
forty-year-old conviction for resisting the military orders, effectively clearing the 
names of all those excluded and incarcerated.57 Judge Patel affirmed a congres-
sional investigative commission’s finding that “race prejudice, war hysteria and 
a failure of political leadership”58 were the underlying causes of this manifest 
injustice. And she concluded that although Korematsu formally remained on the 
law books, it now served as a sharp lesson for judicial vigilance.59 
Judge Patel’s ruling may be viewed narrowly as a belated effort to correct a 
badly tainted judicial record. It also may be seen more broadly as characterizing 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui as cautionary tales of grave injustice arising 
out of popular fears, opportunistic politicians, dissembling officials, and defer-
ential courts. Indeed, Judge Patel cautioned against deploying national security 
justifications as a bar to heightened scrutiny of potentially abusive security ac-
tions. As “historical precedent,” she wrote, Korematsu “stands as a constant cau-
tion . . . that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national se-
curity must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and 
accountability.”60 
i i .  the post-9/11  era  
Despite Judge Patel’s cautionary warning, the post-9/11 era has raised anew 
the specter of Korematsu’s principle of unconditional judicial deference. 
 
55. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 307 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
56. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
57. See id. at 1420. 
58. Id. at 1416-17 (quoting PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 25, at 18). 
59. See id. at 1420; see also Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 4211 (2018)) (authorizing a government apology and reparations). In separate 
proceedings, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of Hirabayashi’s coram nobis petition 
and vacated both his curfew and exclusion convictions. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 
591, 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1987). The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon vacated Ya-
sui’s conviction. Yasui v. United States, No. 83-151-BE (D. Or. Jan. 26, 1984), reprinted in 
Peggy Nagae, Yasui v. United States: From 1941 to Today—Making the Case for the Constitution, 
OR. ST. BAR (2016). 
60. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
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Since 9/11, politicians have relied on the 1944 Supreme Court decision to 
justify sweeping ethnicity- and religion-tinged government actions, both against 
citizens and noncitizens. For instance, shortly after 9/11, a commissioner of the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission cited the case as precedent for a possible mass 
internment of Arabs or Muslims in the United States.61 After the 2015 Paris terror 
attacks, a city mayor in Virginia cited Japanese American incarceration to justify 
not accepting Syrian refugees into the city.62 And as a presidential candidate, 
Donald Trump highlighted Japanese American exclusion as a foundation for bar-
ring present-day Muslim entry into the country.63 Influential jurists, too, have 
continued to embrace the opinion’s judicial passivity (even while refraining from 
expressly citing the case).64 Others, by contrast, have characterized Korematsu 
and Hirabayashi as stark cautionary tales—loaded weapons poised to inflict last-
ing damage on innocent people.65 
Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, the Bush administration initiated a “war against terrorism.”66 
Congress quickly passed the USA Patriot Act, significantly expanding executive 
national security powers.67 Congress created the Department of Homeland 
 
61. See Lynette Clemetson, Traces of Terror: Arab-Americans; Civil Rights Commissioner Under Fire 
for Comments on Arabs, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/us
/traces-terror-arab-americans-civil-rights-commissioner-under-fire-for-comments.html 
[https://perma.cc/SU6H-TCVW]. 
62. See Matt Chittum, Roanoke Mayor David Bowers Broadly Condemned for Statements on Syrian 
Refugees, ROANOKE TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.roanoke.com/news/local/roanoke
/roanoke-mayor-david-bowers-broadly-condemned-for-statements-on-syrian/article_e1e42
34e-006f-558f-bc94-dd566796c261.html [https://perma.cc/T8KB-NVYX]. 
63. See Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend Muslim Ban, ABC NEWS 
(Dec. 8, 2015, 1:01 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-cites-fdr-policies 
-defend-muslim-ban/story?id=35648128 [https://perma.cc/HF4A-ND4G]. 
64. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010) (relying on a State 
Department affidavit and ultimately deferring to the executive branch’s position on a matter 
of asserted national security); see also YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 51-74 (describing Kore-
matsu’s “chameleonic deployment”). 
65. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 71-74. 
66. See The Text of President Bush’s Address Tuesday Night, After Terrorist Attacks on New York and 
Washington, CNN (Sept. 11, 2001, 11:14 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush
.speech.text/ [https://perma.cc/4ER5-W6XN] (“America and our friends and allies join with 
all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war 
against terrorism.”). 
67. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. Code); see also Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2742; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e)(1), 119 Stat. 3136 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. 
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Security to protect the American people and institutions from both domestic and 
foreign terrorism.68 Soon thereafter, the Department initiated an immigrant reg-
istration and tracking program.69 The government’s security arms also advanced 
a range of other measures, including enhanced airport and public transportation 
security, expanded electronic surveillance, and intensified investigation of terror 
networks.70 
But the breadth and intrusiveness of many security measures appeared to re-
flect racial and religious scapegoating.71 Civil liberties advocates warned of hid-
den agendas behind far-reaching antiterrorism policies. One potential agenda 
involved bolstering the administration’s political power by pandering to public 
fears in vilifying vulnerable communities.72 Another aimed to build popular sup-
port for an invasion of Iraq and control of its oil resources—motives rooted in 
politics and economics.73 The Center for Public Integrity identified 532 false 
Bush administration statements about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the threats posed by al Qaeda.74 
The clash of security concerns and constitutional liberties also enmeshed 
policy makers. After 9/11, Peter Kirsanow, a controversial Bush appointee to the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission, suggested that Arab Americans would be in-
terned en masse if the United States suffered another major terror attack. 
 
§ 2241 (2018)); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. § 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018)). 
68. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
69. National Security Entry-Exit Registration System. Registration and Monitoring of Certain 
Nonimmigrants, 8 C.F.R. §§ 214, 264 (2018) (authorizing a system for registering certain 
noncitizens within the United States as part of the war on terror—including port of entry 
registration and domestic registration). 
70. Id. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, For “Our” Security: Who Is an “American” and What Is 
Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23, 40 
(2003). 
71. See Saito, supra note 70 (critiquing post-9/11 administration antiterrorism policies, including 
racial and religious investigative targeting); A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since 
September 11, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2002), https://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/loss_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSB6-J5EY]. 
72. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERROR-
ISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES (2002); Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Im-
perial Presidency: An Examination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. 
L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2002). 
73. See sources cited supra note 72; see also YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 53. 
74. See Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False Pretenses, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 23, 
2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses 
[https://perma.cc/LV45-7CQJ]. 
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Kirsanow invoked Korematsu as precedent.75 He warned that, if such an attack 
occurred, Arab Americans could “forget civil rights in this country.”76 The head 
of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 
Howard Coble, similarly faced public condemnation for implying that he sup-
ported mass ethnic internment, citing the World War II-era incarceration.77 And 
in 2015, retired U.S. Army General and former Commander of the NATO Allied 
Forces Wesley Clark called for segregating American Muslims who possessed 
“radicalized” antigovernment views.78 For Clark, a former Democratic presiden-
tial candidate, religious extremism posed a serious security threat.79 Clark’s call 
for segregation bore two hallmarks: first, it signaled that citizens and noncitizens 
in America could be incarcerated without charges or hearings based on likely 
radical beliefs rather than wrongful actions; and second, it tacitly resurrected 
Korematsu by implying that courts would countenance government suppression 
of individual rights on broadly asserted grounds of national security. 
The courts, too, entered the fray—at times fully deferring to the executive 
branch and its largely unsubstantiated claims of national security, and at other 
times citing Korematsu as a reason for more closely reviewing the government’s 
factual claims. Early in the War on Terror, in Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, U.S. 
District Judge Mukasey called for “deference . . . [to] the President’s determina-
tion” that an American citizen arrested on U.S. soil was an enemy combatant 
and, therefore, could be detained indefinitely.80 José Padilla sued to challenge the 
President’s detention authority and the factual basis for his terrorist designation. 
Judge Mukasey allowed Padilla to challenge his designation, but sharply re-
stricted Padilla’s ability to effectively advocate on his behalf. Guided by the All 
 
75. See Harris, supra note 4, at 22 (“Kirsanow’s comments reveal a genuinely frightening and dark 
fact. In the aftermath of another serious attack by extremists . . . some will argue that the in-
ternment of Arabs and Muslims is a necessary measure that national security demands.”). 
76. Clemetson, supra note 61. Responding to public condemnation of this statement, Kirsanow 
later claimed that “his comments were meant to acknowledge, not condone, possible senti-
ment after another terrorist attack” and that “[t]he whole premise [of his comments] was to 
make clear that these attitudes must be roundly condemned.” Id. 
77. See Carl Ingram, Assembly Demands Head of House Panel Quit, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2003), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/20/local/me-internment20 [https://perma.cc/WL35 
-S4Y6] (reporting on Coble’s remarks and the backlash to them). 
78. See Murtaza Hussain, Wesley Clark Calls for Internment Camps for “Radicalized” Americans, IN-
TERCEPT (July 20, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/20/chattanooga-wesley 
-clark-calls-internment-camps-disloyal-americans/ [https://perma.cc/3QVB-Z8K7] (re-
porting on Clark’s comments). 
79. Id. 
80. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 605-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. 
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
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Writs Act81 instead of making a purely constitutional ruling,82 Judge Mukasey 
gave Padilla’s counsel no authority to conduct discovery, cross-examine wit-
nesses, or effectively rebut officials’ claims.83 In addition to limiting Padilla’s 
counsel’s participation, Judge Mukasey adopted the attenuated “some evidence” 
standard advocated by the Bush administration.84 Padilla eventually refiled his 
case in a different district, where he prevailed; but the Fourth Circuit reversed.85 
After multiple appeals, the government foreclosed a judicial determination on 
the merits of Padilla’s challenge to indefinite military detention by prosecuting 
him in the U.S. criminal system.86 
In the same timeframe, American citizen Yaser Hamdi challenged his mili-
tary detention as an enemy combatant.87 The lower court characterized the Jus-
tice Department’s evidence (a declaration by Michael Mobbs, Special Adviser to 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) as “little more than the government’s 
‘say so’ regarding the validity of Hamdi’s classification” and observed that “if the 
Court were to accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient justification for detain-
ing Hamdi . . . this Court would be acting as little more than a rubber-stamp.”88 
On appeal, the government argued that “courts may not second-guess the mili-
tary’s determination”;89 the government had suggested, in the court’s phrasing, 
that “[the military’s] determinations on this score are the first and final word.”90 
 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). 
82. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599-601; see Tania Cruz, Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Exec-
utive Restrictions of Civil Liberties When “Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused,” 2 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 129, 146 (2003). 
83. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (“[A]ccess to counsel need be granted only for purposes of 
presenting facts to the court in connection with this petition if Padilla wishes to do so.”); see 
Cruz, supra note 82, at 146 (explaining that Padilla’s limited access to counsel effectively “ex-
cluded Padilla from using counsel to conduct discovery, cross-examine witnesses, and mean-
ingfully rebut the executive’s testimony”). 
84. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608; see Cruz, supra note 82, at 147-48 (“Padilla’s access to counsel 
for presenting facts in the habeas proceeding was essentially a façade . . . . Most important, 
the district court predetermined that the executive would prevail through the invocation of a 
practically nonexistent standard.”). 
85. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
86. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (denying petition for 
a writ of certiorari on grounds that the claim had been mooted by events, as Padilla was 
“charged with crimes and released from military custody” to be prosecuted in federal court). 
87. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
88. Id. at 535. 
89. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 28, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(No. 02-6895), 2002 WL 32728567. 
90. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. 
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The Fourth Circuit agreed and discharged the lower court’s habeas writ.91 The 
court denied a rehearing en banc92 but Judge Motz dissented, writing that the 
judiciary “must not forget the lesson of Korematsu.”93 Here, “as in Korematsu, the 
Executive has failed to proffer any real evidence to justify” Hamdi’s prolonged 
detention.94 Judge Motz quoted Justice Murphy’s Korematsu dissent, which 
stated that “[i]ndividuals must not be left impoverished of their constitutional 
rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support.”95 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor observed that 
during hostilities, judicial deference “serves only to condense power into a single 
branch of government.”96 She declared that “[w]e have long since made clear 
that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the 
rights of the Nation’s citizens,” and she too quoted Justice Murphy’s dissent for 
the proposition that “it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the 
courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles 
of reviewing and resolving” civil liberties claims.97 Justice Souter, joined by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, cited Korematsu as a cautionary illustration.98 
Later in the war on terror, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,99 citizens 
and domestic humanitarian organizations challenged as constitutionally over-
broad a statute making it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material sup-
port or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”100 Chief Justice Roberts, 
for the majority, first declared that the possible infringement of First Amend-
ment rights called for heightened scrutiny.101 But like the majority in Korematsu, 
the Court deferred. It accepted without careful review the conclusory, hearsay-
 
91. Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450. 
92. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (denying “petition for rehearing and 
suggestion for rehearing en banc”). 
93. Id. at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. at 375-76. 
95. Id. at 376 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1994) (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing)). The Supreme Court ruled that Hamdi was entitled to full adjudicatory review of his 
challenge to his enemy combatant status. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). But the 
government, rather than prosecuting Hamdi, released him outside the United States. See Eric 
K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President 
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 316 (2005). 
96. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
97. Id. at 535-36. 
98. See id. at 542-44. 
99. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), amended by USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 704, 
129 Stat. 268, 300. 
101. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28. 
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laden affidavit of a State Department official.102 When the executive claims that 
its actions are necessary to protect national security, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
the executive “is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we 
grant weight to its empirical conclusions.”103 As Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid 
Wuerth later noted, the majority accepted the Obama administration’s claim of 
necessity “without any scrutiny.”104 
In dissent, Justice Breyer—joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor—
acknowledged the government’s compelling interest in combating terrorism.105 
But he also highlighted the majority’s failure to insist upon “specific evidence, 
rather than general assertion[s].”106 Courts must examine the facts on national 
security—“whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether 
the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so 
substantial as to justify the stringent restriction.”107 The government’s “author-
ity and expertise in these matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own 
obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individu-
als.”108 
Three years later, the Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International109 rejected a 
constitutional challenge to a section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA).110 Journalists, lawyers, and advocates who worked with foreigners out-
side the United States had claimed that the government improperly employed 
FISA—which authorizes foreign intelligence surveillance—to spy on American 
citizens in the United States. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked threshold 
standing to challenge surveillance under the Act because, based on the govern-
ment’s representations, foreigners were targeted, and the American claimants 
 
102. The Court relied on the State Department’s conclusory statement that the “‘experience and 
analysis of the U.S. government agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly sup-
por[t]’ Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further ter-
rorism.” Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (citing Declaration of Kenneth R. McKune at 133, 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (No. 98-1498), 2009 WL 3877534). 
103. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added). 
104. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1897, 1967-68 (2015). 
105. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 62. 
107. Id. at 54; see also id. at 34 (majority opinion) (insisting that courts do not abdicate the judicial 
role even in the national security arena); id. at 45, 61-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). 
108. Id. at 61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
109. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
110. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-261, 
§ 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438. 
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could not show a reasonable likelihood that their own communications were tar-
geted.111 
Edward Snowden’s subsequent leak of classified documents revealed that far 
more Americans than acknowledged in Clapper had been swept up in the gov-
ernment’s information gathering.112 Senators accused the Justice Department of 
key factual misstatements in legally justifying the far-reaching government sur-
veillance.113 As First Circuit Judge Sandra Lynch noted, 
One could question whether the Supreme Court’s role in providing a 
check to executive power had been undermined in Clapper . . . . A judici-
ary, without the facts or an independent means of acquiring them, stands 
in danger of being manipulated by the very political branches it was de-
signed to control. That happened in Korematsu.114 
All of this illuminates Justice Scalia’s 2014 prophecy that a sweeping curtail-
ment of civil liberties could “happen again.”115 Indeed, this prediction played out 
in American politicians’ calls for the barring of Muslims from entering the 
United States.116 These calls—fueled by fears following the attacks in Paris, San 
 
111. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411. 
112. See Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-for 
-challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/M336-BU9E]; Charlie Savage, Justice 
Dept. Criticized on Spying Statements, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/05/14/us/justice-dept-criticized-on-spying-statements.html [https://perma.cc/7YRX
-2Z5L]. 
113. See, e.g., Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the Shadows, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
623, 627 (2017) (describing how, “[c]oncerned, several U.S. Senators wrote a letter to the DOJ 
accusing it of having been less than forthright with the Clapper Court”); Kate Tummarello, 
Senators Ask DOJ to Come Clean on Supreme Court Surveillance Case, HILL (Nov. 21, 2013, 1:44 
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/191088-senators-ask-doj-to-come-clean-on 
-supreme-court-surveillance-case [https://perma.cc/6UZ8-VNL3] (describing how several 
senators asked the Department of Justice to clarify misleading statements). 
114. Lynch, supra note 113, at 628. 
115. See Weiss, supra note 7. 
116. See Aaron Blake, Whip Count: Here’s Where Republicans Stand on Trump’s Controversial Travel 
Ban, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017
/01/29/heres-where-republicans-stand-on-president-trumps-controversial-travel-ban 
[https://perma.cc/TQ7K-7DYL]; Chittum, supra note 62; Tomo Hirai, Politicians Link War-
time Incarceration of Japanese Americans in Syrian Refugee Crisis, NICHI BEI WEEKLY (Dec. 3, 
2015), https://www.nichibei.org/2015/12/politicians-link-wartime-incarceration-of 
-japanese-americans-in-syrian-refugee-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/WK6E-KQZM]; Daniel 
Victor, Roanoke Mayor Apologizes for Japanese Internment Remarks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/us/roanoke-mayor-apologizes-for-japanese 
-internment-remarks.html [https://perma.cc/8G5J-RKJM]; see also YAMAMOTO, supra note 
4, at 15-16 (describing politicians’ calls for mass religion-based treatment). 
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Bernardino, and Orlando—coalesced in President Trump’s anti-Muslim state-
ments117 and three ensuing executive orders.118 
Terror attacks warrant security officials’ swift and rational responses in 
catching and prosecuting perpetrators and in taking grounded, proactive steps 
to prevent future violence.119 And after 9/11, the government established a mul-
tilevel system to track security threats, prosecute perpetrators, and restructure 
the immigration vetting system.120 But a majority of Republican voters still en-
dorsed then-candidate Trump’s prescribed “complete and total shutdown” of 
Muslim entry into the United States.121 And with his reference to the Japanese 
American incarceration as precedent,122 nearly half of Republican voters thought 
 
117. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438-40 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
118. See id. at 3403-04 (majority opinion). The third executive order—the proclamation at issue in 
Trump v. Hawaii—restricts entry of all immigrants and certain categories of nonimmigrants 
from specified countries—primarily Muslim-majority—for inadequate vetting procedures 
and government information sharing. The proclamation also excludes some foreign nationals 
with substantial ties to the United States and creates a limited waiver program. See Enhancing 
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by 
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 
27, 2017). Restrictions placed on these countries echo the original exclusion orders’ policy “to 
protect [United States] citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks 
in the United States; and to prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit 
United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.” Protecting the Nation from For-
eign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, § 2 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
119. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 10, at 34-46. 
120. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
UNITED STATES 383-98 (2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T39Q-M45J]; see also David Bier, Very Few Immigration Vetting Failures of 
Terrorists Since 9/11, CATO INST. (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/very 
-few-immigration-vetting-failures-terrorists-911 [https://perma.cc/36MV-SEAD] (ques-
tioning whether the post-9/11 changes were necessary). 
121. See Tom Jensen, Trump Edges Cruz in Iowa; His Supporters Think Japanese Internment Was 




122. See Rebecca Kaplan, Trump Defends Muslim Plan by Comparing Himself to FDR, CBS NEWS 
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-defends-muslim-plan-by 
-comparing-himself-to-fdr [https://perma.cc/5FEM-5M7P]. See generally DOUGLAS LITTLE, 
US VERSUS THEM: THE UNITED STATES, RADICAL ISLAM, AND THE RISE OF THE GREEN THREAT 
223-31 (2016) (analyzing how us-vs-them attitudes and narratives in the United States con-
tributed to Muslim scapegoating).  
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that the mass racial imprisonment was a “good idea,” and more than half sup-
ported “Trump’s call to ban[] Muslims from entering the United States.”123 
i i i .  trump v.  hawaii  
Challenges to President Trump’s 2017 executive orders—colloquially de-
scribed as a “travel ban” or “Muslim ban”124—raised again the threshold issue in 
Korematsu: will the judiciary defer to the executive branch and passively accept 
its national security justifications? Or will courts carefully scrutinize the govern-
ment’s claims of pressing public necessity? 
A. The 2017 Executive Orders 
Shortly after the 2016 election, a Trump campaign surrogate cited Japanese 
American incarceration as precedent for sweeping Muslim exclusionary 
measures, including the creation of a Muslim registry. “[I]t is legal. [The Presi-
dent’s transition advisors] say it will hold constitutional muster,”125 he said. 
“We’ve done it based on race, we’ve done it based on religion,” and “[w]e did it 
during World War II with Japanese.”126 And, he added, the Supreme Court “up-
held things as horrific as Japanese internment camps”127—directly implicating 
Korematsu. 
 
123. Jensen, supra note 121 (reporting a December 2015 Iowa poll finding that forty-eight percent 
of presidential candidate Trump’s supporters considered the Japanese American incarceration 
during World War II a good idea). 
124. See, e.g., Rowaida Abdelaziz, Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Forcing Some Americans to Move to War-
torn Countries to Reunite with Their Families, HUFFPOST (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muslim-ban-separating-americans-from-family_us_5b636791e4
b0de86f49f4f96 [https://perma.cc/8BD2-PAWP] (referring to the third executive order as a 
“Muslim ban”); Farah Amjad, Is the Democratic Party Progressive Enough for Muslims?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151907/democratic-party 
-progressive-enough-muslims [https://perma.cc/2V39-FSXJ] (referring to the executive or-
ders collectively as a “Muslim ban”); David Remnick, Kelela Reinvents R. & B., and Sally Yates 
Gets Fired, NEW YORKER (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-new 
-yorker-radio-hour/kelela-reinvents-r-and-b-and-sally-yates-gets-fired [https://perma.cc
/J6XP-AZQ5] (describing the first executive order as a “Muslim travel ban”). 
125. On Fox, Trump Supporter Carl Higbie Cites Japanese Internment Camps as “Precedent” for Muslim 
Registry, MEDIA MATTERS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.mediamatters.org/video/2016/11/16
/fox-trump-supporter-carl-higbie-cites-japanese-internment-camps-precedent-muslim 
-registry/214509 [https://perma.cc/KA4L-E94T] (reporting Higbie’s statements). 
126. Id. 
127. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Trump Camp’s Talk of Registry and Japanese Internment Raises Muslims’ 
Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/politics 
/japanese-internment-muslim-registry.html [https://perma.cc/JV42-AH6F]. 
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The week after his inauguration, the President issued the first of three exclu-
sion orders. Some supported the restrictive measure.128 But others condemned 
it. Business and religious leaders, politicians, scholars, and civil liberties groups, 
along with Muslim communities, called the orders discriminatory.129 Massachu-
setts Attorney General Maura Healey characterized the order as “akin to 
“tak[ing] a wrecking ball to the Statue of Liberty.”130 Individuals and states 
launched legal challenges. Judges issued nationwide restraining orders.131 
Still, the President’s 2017 exclusion orders and politicians’ citations to the 
World War II-era incarceration rested on one tremulous legal leg. Although 
deeply discredited, Korematsu’s validation of the forced racial removal had never 
been overruled by the Supreme Court.132 Most importantly, the Court had not 
jettisoned the case’s “principle of unconditional judicial deference to the execu-
tive on national security matters.”133 Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
prominent Seventh Circuit Judge Posner had earlier endorsed key aspects of Ko-
rematsu.134 
 
128. See Chris Kahn, More Americans Support Donald Trump’s Travel Ban than Oppose It, Poll Shows, 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:51 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/amer-
icas/donald-trump-muslim-ban-travel-immigration-refugees-iran-iraq-syria 
-a7556186.html [https://perma.cc/W5GC-PY7X]. 
129. See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans, A Watershed Moment in CEO Activism, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2017, 
9:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-watershed-moment-in-ceo-activism-14913
10803 [https://perma.cc/JY5P-DAJG]; Andy Newman, Highlights: Reaction to Trump’s Travel 
Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/nyregion/trump-
travel-ban-protests-briefing.html [https://perma.cc/ET3L-N3FM]. 
130. Maura Healey (@maura_healey), TWITTER (Jan. 28, 2017, 5:40 PM), https://twitter.com
/maura_healey/status/825473640707813380 [https://perma.cc/HX36-U4Q8]; see also Heidi 
Chang, Ahead of Supreme Court Fight, Trump Travel Ban Opponents Reflect on Past Anti-Asian 
Policies, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/ahead-
supreme-court-fight-trump-travel-ban-opponents-reflect-past-n867496 [https://perma.cc
/6MHC-927E]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Trump’s Immigration Ban Draws Deep Anger and Muted 
Praise, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/trumps 
-immigration-ban-disapproval-applause.html [https://perma.cc/4E9A-4U46]. 
131. See Hawai’i v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting a motion for a temporary 
restraining order against President Trump’s third executive order); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017) (granting in part and denying in part a 
motion for a temporary restraining order against President Trump’s second executive order); 
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (grant-
ing a motion for a temporary restraining order against President Trump’s first executive or-
der). 
132. See Greene, supra note 5, at 386-90; Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J.F. 
629 (2019). 
133. YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 9. 
134. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 205-11 
(1998) (asserting that, while the Court decided Korematsu incorrectly as it relates to U.S. 
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In his book All the Laws but One, Chief Justice Rehnquist intimated that, in 
light of the government’s broad war and national security powers and control 
over immigration, the courts should enforce all laws, with one exception.135 
They need not, and should not during hostilities, closely enforce the Constitu-
tion’s protection of civilian liberties. The political branches essentially hold a 
blank check on these matters at least until hostilities end.136 The former Chief 
Justice observed that Korematsu was correctly decided as to first generation Jap-
anese immigrants in America.137 Without acknowledging the revelations of the 
coram nobis litigation or the findings of Congress’s Commission on the Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians,138 however, the Chief Justice’s broader 
pronouncements extended beyond the first generation to encompass all persons 
of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens. Tracking Justice Black’s broad 
language in Korematsu that encompassed both immigrants and citizens, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote approvingly that “[t]he Court’s answer . . . seems satis-
factory—those of Japanese descent were displaced because of fear that disloyal 
elements among them would aid Japan in the war.”139 Most importantly, his 
book’s language—including the book’s title—appeared to endorse the extremely 
deferential judicial approach that legally validated the entire “internment.”140 
After the initiation of the Gulf War, Judge Posner maintained that “Kore-
matsu was correctly decided,”141 highlighting the importance of judicial reticence 
 
citizens of Japanese ancestry, the government’s treatment of non-U.S. citizen Japanese immi-
grants was permissible, despite the admitted racial prejudice); Pamela S. Karlan & Richard A. 
Posner, The Triumph of Expedience: How America Lost the Election to the Courts, HARPER’S MAG. 
(May 2001), https://archive.harpers.org/2001/05/pdf/HarpersMagazine-2001-05-0072056
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9Q-T2HK] (quoting Judge Posner as saying that “Korematsu was 
correctly decided”). 
135. See REHNQUIST, supra note 134, at 202, 224-25. 
136. See id. at 224-25. 
137. See id. at 201, 203, 209. 
138. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 25; see also Harris, supra note 4, at 17 (describing 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s historical myopia as “mind-boggling,” citing the former Chief Jus-
tice’s failure to engage with overwhelming evidence and judicial findings of serious govern-
ment deception in initiating the World War II incarceration and in altering and fabricating 
key parts of the factual record on military necessity in legally justifying it).  
139. See REHNQUIST, supra note 134, at 206.  
140. See id. at 207. Consistent with Korematsu’s deference principle, the Chief Justice concluded 
that courts should allow the executive branch “to respond to a condition without [the courts] 
making a careful inquiry into how that condition came about.” Id.; see Eric L. Muller, All the 
Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (1999) (characterizing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s view as having deferential judges “accede by avoiding or narrowing their readings 
of the Bill of Rights until the crisis is over”). 
141. Karlan & Posner, supra note 134, at 39 (quoting Posner’s statement from a public exchange 
shortly before 9/11 that Korematsu was correctly decided); see Kermit Roosevelt, Richard A. 
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rather than independence. Korematsu appropriately enabled courts during hos-
tilities to say, “we’re going to defer.”142 
According to observers, the events of the post-9/11 era resurrected these con-
tested aspects of Korematsu “with potentially profound consequences.”143 
B. “Animus, Invective, and Obvious Pretext” 
In response to challenges to the President’s exclusion orders,144 the Justice 
Department asserted that the orders were “unreviewable.”145 But two district 
court judges and two courts of appeals disagreed. They closely scrutinized the 
facts and determined that the President’s noncitizen exclusion orders were not 
supported by genuine security concerns but rather, in the words of one judge, 
wholly reflected “religious animus, invective, and obvious pretext.”146 
Another judge cited the assessment of forty-nine bipartisan former national 
security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials who had jointly declared that 
“‘concrete evidence’ has shown that ‘country-based bans are ineffective,’”147 and 
that the President’s orders “fail[] to advance the national security or foreign pol-
icy interests of the United States but would cause serious and multiple harms to 
those interests.”148 The Fourth Circuit, too, sitting en banc, refused “to ignore 
evidence, circumscribe [its] review, and blindly defer”149 to the President. It cited 
Korematsu as a cautionary warning, stating that “‘unconditional deference to a 
government agent’s invocation of “emergency” . . . has a lamentable place in our 
 
Posner’s “Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/books/review/richard-a-posners-divergent-paths 
-the-academy-and-the-judiciary.html [https://perma.cc/YUK7-S9Z3]; see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
(2006) (expressing the view that judges must read the Constitution flexibly in times of na-
tional emergency). 
142. Karlan & Posner, supra note 134, at 39. 
143. Harris, supra note 4, at 20. 
144. See Hawai’i v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project 
v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 
WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
145. See Hawai’i, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1154 (“[T]he Government again invokes the doctrine of con-
sular nonreviewability in an effort to circumvent judicial review of seemingly any Executive 
action denying entry to an alien abroad.”). 
146. Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Haw. 2017). 
147. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 593 (D. Md. 2017).  
148. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former National Security Officials in Support of Respondents at 15, 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1733146. 
149. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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history,’ . . . and is incompatible with our duty to evaluate the evidence before 
us.”150 
C. “How Is this Different than Korematsu?” 
At the Supreme Court oral argument in Trump v. Hawaii, U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral Francisco enlivened Justice Jackson’s warning in Korematsu that the case’s 
principle of extreme judicial deference would lie about like a “loaded weapon.” 
In urging the Court to uphold the “travel ban,” he declined to argue that factual 
realities showed that certain noncitizens posed an impending security danger or 
that there was a compelling need for sweeping action targeting the members of 
a specific religion. Rather, he effectively urged the Court to ignore the evidence, 
asserting that the President had brought to the courts a plausible claim of urgent 
need based on an “extensive worldwide” interagency review and that this should 
be enough for a deferential Court.151 
The Solicitor General mustered that argument for judicial passivity as a stra-
tegic move to end-run disclosure of the truth—whether the government pos-
sessed a bona fide security justification set forth in its undisclosed 2017 Home-
land Security report. Because of the elected branches’ immigration, foreign 
policy, and national security powers, Francisco asserted, “there is a very strong 
presumption that what is being set out there [in the proclamation] is the 
truth.”152 According to Francisco, the Court should almost always accept the 
President’s word, even without substantial evidence of impending security 
threats. 
When Justice Sotomayor probed, Francisco acknowledged that the govern-
ment had kept the Homeland Security report under wraps. The government re-
fused to disclose its justifying report to either litigants or the courts.153 In es-
sence, Solicitor General Francisco implored the Court, just trust us. 
But the undisclosed report was apparently a mere seventeen pages154—
hardly reflective of extensive worldwide security analysis. In the companion case 
IRAP v. Trump, Judge Chuang of the District of Maryland had voiced strong 
skepticism about the report. It had been prepared after-the-fact to justify the 
policy prescriptions. And an earlier Homeland Security report found little 
 
150. Id. at 603 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
151. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-
965), 2018 WL 2446100.  
152. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
153. See id. at 26. 
154. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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security benefit from the kind of exclusionary measures embodied in the execu-
tive orders.155 Moreover, the plaintiffs maintained that the report’s contents had 
been contested within the Department and had contradicted statements in the 
proclamation—hence the government’s unwillingness to open the report to 
scrutiny.156 The government’s attorney called for the court to deferentially accept 
the unproven facts recited in the presidential order and the undisclosed report. 
Judge Chuang declined, instead challenging the attorney: “How is this different 
than Korematsu?”157 
D.  “Blindly Accepting the Government’s Misguided Invitation to Sanction a 
Discriminatory Policy” 
The Supreme Court’s five-member majority in Trump v. Hawaii,158 led by 
Chief Justice Roberts, effectively upheld the President’s third order, dissolving a 
nationwide preliminary injunction. The majority first determined that the order 
did not exceed “any textual [statutory] limit on the President’s authority.”159 The 
Court then concluded that the order did not violate the Constitution’s Establish-
ment Clause barring religious discrimination. The exclusion order was facially 
neutral.160 And even if the Court examined the President’s intent, the order 
would survive because it was “expressly premised on legitimate [national secu-
rity] purposes.”161 The Court would not “substitute [its] own assessment for the 
Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate, com-
plex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’”162 
Justice Sotomayor’s vociferous dissent called out the majority’s choice to “ig-
nor[e] the facts, misconstru[e] our legal precedent, and turn[] a blind eye to the 
pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individ-
uals, many of whom are United States citizens.”163 Highlighting the damage to 
 
155. See OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MOST FOR-
EIGN-BORN, US-BASED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS RADICALIZED AFTER ENTERING HOMELAND; OP-
PORTUNITIES FOR TAILORED CVE PROGRAMS EXIST 2 (2017). 
156. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d. 539, 561-64 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d 
in part and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). 
157. Josh Gerstein, Federal Judge Hears Challenge to the Third Version of Trump’s Travel Ban, POLIT-
ICO (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/16/trump-travel-ban-judge 
-maryland-243840 [https://perma.cc/A2GW-CPLY] (quoting Judge Chuang). 
158. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
159. Id. at 2410. 
160. Id. at 2418. 
161. Id. at 2421. 
162. Id. (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
163. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Muslim communities, she detailed numerous examples of the Administration’s 
anti-Muslim animus, characterizing the executive orders as religious animosity 
“masquerad[ing] behind a facade of national-security concerns.”164 
Given the paucity of evidence supporting the “superficial claim of national 
security,” Justice Sotomayor characterized the Trump majority’s “rational basis” 
review as blindly deferential, paralleling the Korematsu majority’s closed-eyed 
approach.165 She echoed Judge Chuang’s earlier assessment that in both Kore-
matsu and Trump, the government went to great lengths to shield its key security 
report from view.166 The government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence 
agencies’ views of the security concerns.167 In ignoring the President’s repeated 
anti-Muslim statements, Justice Sotomayor continued, the majority empowered 
the President to hide behind an internal review process that the government re-
fused to disclose to the public.168 By “blindly accepting the Government’s mis-
guided invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by animosity to-
ward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial claim of national 
security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Kore-
matsu.”169 
Justice Sotomayor also underscored Trump’s “harm to our constitutional 
fabric” in redeploying Korematsu’s logic170—individuals “left impoverished of 
their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither sub-
stance nor support.”171 She concluded by highlighting the imperative of judicial 
independence for a checks-and-balances democracy through careful judicial 
scrutiny: “Our Constitution demands, and our country deserves, a Judiciary 
willing to hold the coordinate branches to account when they defy our most sa-
cred legal commitments.”172 The constitutional scheme commands courts to act 
as guardians of precious liberties when fears and prejudices of the moment over-
run Congress and the President—what the judiciary failed to do in Korematsu.173 
Reacting to Justice Sotomayor’s linkage of Trump to Korematsu, Chief Justice 
Roberts closed the majority opinion with a passage that, although significant, 
 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 2448. 
166. Id. at 2447-48. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 2442-44. 
169. Id. at 2448. 
170. Id. at 2447-48. 
171. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
172. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
173. See infra notes 213 and 243. 
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reads like an afterthought. While stopping short of explicitly overruling Kore-
matsu, Chief Justice Roberts observed:  
The dissent’s reference to Korematsu . . . affords this Court the oppor-
tunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely 
wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history 
and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.”174 
Justice Sotomayor agreed that “this formal repudiation of a shameful prece-
dent is laudable and long overdue.”175 The Court’s belated rejection of the forced 
racial removal was important for formerly incarcerated Japanese Americans. 
But the Court’s renunciation of Korematsu was crucially—and misleadingly—
limited. It only reached what Chief Justice Roberts described as Korematsu’s val-
idation of the “forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps solely 
and explicitly on the basis of race.”176 Of course, that was not what was at play 
in Trump—hence the majority opinion’s statement that “Korematsu has nothing 
to do with” Trump, finding it “wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order 
to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of ad-
mission.”177 
In distinguishing Trump from Korematsu, however, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
description badly mischaracterized the 1944 decision. First, similar to Trump’s 
religion-neutral executive order, the exclusion order in Korematsu was race-neu-
tral.178 Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s phrasing, the Korematsu majority did 
not address government action taken “explicitly on the basis of race.”179 Second, 
the forced removal, like Trump’s exclusion orders, targeted foreign nationals, 
too.180 Korematsu was not only about abuse of “U.S. citizens.”181 Third, the Ko-
rematsu majority did not limit its ruling to confinement in “concentration 
camps.”182 It more broadly validated the mass racial exclusion from designated 
areas—incorporating the earlier Hirabayashi and Yasui decisions approving the 
less intrusive, though still restrictive, racial curfew—thus, like Trump, addressing 
 
174. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
175. Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 2423 (majority opinion). 
177. Id. 
178. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20. 
179. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20. Justice Murphy’s dissent, by con-
trast, characterized the decision as a descent “into the ugly abyss of racism.” Korematsu, 323 
U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
180. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-17 (majority opinion). 
181. See id. 
182. See id. at 223. 
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blanket restriction and exclusion.183 Finally, as in Trump, Korematsu expressly 
justified the exclusionary executive order not on impermissible racial or religious 
grounds but on a claim of national security—albeit unsubstantiated. Contrary to 
Chief Justice Roberts’s description, it did not purport to approve government 
action undertaken “solely . . . on the basis of race.”184 
Only by distorting what the Korematsu Court said and did was Chief Justice 
Roberts able to declare “wholly inapt”185 the likening of key aspects of Korematsu 
to Trump, and to thereby reject Korematsu while upholding the entry ban on 
those from Muslim-majority countries. 
Most significantly, the Trump majority did not extend its repudiation to the 
most dangerous aspect of Korematsu—its unconditional deference to the execu-
tive branch. Instead, Trump reinscribed this “logic”186 by expressly embracing 
extreme judicial passivity in the foreign policy and immigration settings and val-
idating the President’s proclamation “on a barren invocation of national secu-
rity.”187 As Anil Kalhan observed, the majority “engaged in a cheap parlor trick: 
purporting to ‘overrule’ a narrow, distorted version of Korematsu while simulta-
neously embracing and replicating that decision’s actual logic.”188 Justice So-
tomayor thus characterized the limited “overruling” as the Court “merely re-
plac[ing] one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”189 
Before Trump, Korematsu had been discredited and judges felt uncomfortable 
citing it while at times nevertheless employing its minimalist judicial ap-
proach.190 Humanitarian Law Project is illustrative.191 There, the majority—led 
by Chief Justice Roberts—first acknowledged that heightened scrutiny was ap-
propriate given the citizens groups’ First Amendment claims.192 Yet it fully de-
ferred to the executive branch and its empty factual proffering on national secu-
rity193 without citing Korematsu, despite its resonance. 
 
183. See id. at 217-18. 
184. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219, 220, 223-24. 
185. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
186. Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
187. Id. at 2447. 
188. Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaii and Chief Justice Roberts’s “Korematsu Overruled” Parlor Trick, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 29, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trump-v-hawaii-and 
-chief-justice-robertss-korematsu-overruled-parlor-trick [https://perma.cc/BY3M-M7P3]. 
189. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2423 (majority opinion)). 
190. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 67-71 (describing courts’ “implied recognition” of Korematsu). 
191. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2015). 
192. See id. at 27-28. 
193. See id. at 48, 55, 61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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In national security cases after June 2018, judges now possess a citation to 
bolster an exceedingly deferential posture without having to draw, at least di-
rectly, upon Korematsu. What could not be comfortably cited earlier can be 
openly cited now—as Trump v. Hawaii. And this transition makes it far easier for 
courts in future cases to blindly defer to the President and accept largely unsub-
stantiated or even manufactured claims of national security as justification for 
curtailing fundamental liberties. 
For this reason, immigration law scholar Hiroshi Motomura trenchantly ob-
served that narrowly “[o]verruling Korematsu the way the court did in this case 
reduces the overruling to symbolism that is so bare that it is deeply trou-
bling . . . . If the majority really wanted to bury Korematsu, they would have 
struck down the travel ban.”194 
Justice Jackson’s warning rings ever loudly. A crucial part of Korematsu sur-
vives in Trump—“blindly accepting the Government’s . . . superficial claim of 
national security.”195 And it stands as a reloaded weapon ready for the hands of 
an authority with a plausible, even if unfounded, claim of urgent need. 
iv.  back to the future 
What does this mean moving forward, beyond validation of President 
Trump’s travel ban? Must courts always defer to the executive branch when re-
viewing national security-justified restrictions of civil liberties? Or, at least in 
some situations, should they closely scrutinize the executive branch’s claims of 
pressing public necessity?196 
A. The AUMF and 2012 NDAA 
Consider the potential impact of Korematsu and Trump in light of the pend-
ing 2018 congressional resolution on the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF).197 This proposed resolution and its 2001 predecessor198 authorize the 
President to undertake wars related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. One aspect of 
 
194. Charlie Savage, Korematsu, Notorious Supreme Court Ruling on Japanese Internment, Is Finally 
Tossed Out, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us 
/korematsu-supreme-court-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/59J3-XA7N] (quoting Moto-
mura). 
195. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
196. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (declaring that “pressing public neces-
sity” could justify discriminatory security measures). 
197. Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2018, S.J. Res. 59, 115th Cong. 
198. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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this power is the authority to designate persons who could be placed in indefinite 
military detention, particularly American citizens on U.S. soil. The 2001 AUMF 
was silent on this matter, although the Bush and Obama administrations199 and 
a lower court broadly interpreted the AUMF as providing implicit authoriza-
tion.200 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA),201 ref-
erencing the AUMF, made this presidential authority—to detain indefinitely—
explicit as to citizens and noncitizens who “substantially supported al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, or associated forces . . . engaged in hostilities against the United 
States,” including persons committing a “belligerent act” in aid of such an en-
emy.202 Because the NDAA did not define its key terms, American journalists and 
human rights organizations challenged the Act’s potentially overbroad reach and 
chilling impact on legitimate First Amendment activities. In Hedges v. Obama,203 
the lower court cited Korematsu as a cautionary warning204 and undertook “ex-
acting scrutiny” to determine if the security restraint on liberty was “actually 
necessary,”205 finding a key section of the Act to be unconstitutional. The Second 
Circuit, however, reversed on standing grounds without ruling on the merits.206 
The NDAA still stands. 
The proposed 2018 AUMF would expand the President’s capacity under the 
2012 NDAA to name new “associated forces,” thereby broadening the potential 
pool of Americans subject to prolonged detention without charges or trial.207 
 
199. See Jon Schwarz, New Bipartisan Bill Could Give Any President the Power to Imprison U.S. Citi-
zens in Military Detention Forever, INTERCEPT (May 1, 2018, 3:29 PM), https://theintercept
.com/2018/05/01/ndaa-2018-aumf-detention/ [https://perma.cc/32JJ-HPWU]; see also 
Bruce Ackerman, Will Congress Cede Its War-Making Authority to Trump?, ATLANTIC (June 20, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/will-congress-cede-its-war 
-making-authority-to-trump/530910/ [https://perma.cc/83PM-RF37]. 
200. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391-92, 397 (4th Cir. 2005). 
201. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 
(2011). The Act in part addresses the Non-Detention Act of 1971’s requirement of congres-
sional approval to indefinitely detain citizens without charges or trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) 
(2018). 
202. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1021(b). 
203. 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013). 
204. See id. at 431, 459. 
205. Id. at 465. 
206. Hedges, 724 F.3d 170. 
207. See Marjorie Cohn, Will Congress Authorize Indefinite Detention of Americans?, TRUTHOUT 
(May 10, 2018), https://truthout.org/articles/will-congress-authorize-indefinite-detention 
-of-americans [https://perma.cc/55VK-8JSZ]; Derek Royden, Sword of Damocles: Reviewing 
the 2018 AUMF, NATION OF CHANGE (May 4, 2018), https://www.nationofchange.org/2018
/05/04/sword-of-damocles-reviewing-the-2018-aumf/ [https://perma.cc/L728-K3NZ]. 
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Even if the new AUMF is not adopted, the prospect of indefinite military deten-
tion of citizens on American soil remains under its predecessor and the NDAA. 
Buried in the debates about the scope and operation of the AUMF and NDAA 
lies a threshold legal process question: if a President designates and indefinitely 
detains a citizen as a “substantial supporter of associated forces” or an enemy 
belligerent—a fact-intensive determination—is a reviewing court required to 
fully defer to the President and his or her fact-based assessment? Or should the 
court carefully scrutinize that crucial assessment? After the Supreme Court’s 
post-9/11 Hamdi208 and Boumediene209 rulings, a detainee is entitled to challenge 
the appropriateness of the designation. But following Trump, it appears at first 
glance that any ensuing review could amount to little more than a deferential 
rubber stamp. 
B. A Flickering Light? 
Yet there remains a flickering aspirational light. The limiting language in 
Chief Justice Roberts’s Trump opinion leaves a potential legal and political open-
ing. As Justice Kennedy’s quixotic concurrence emphasized, the “Court does 
acknowledge that in some instances, governmental action may be subject to ju-
dicial review.”210 The majority opinion’s call for overriding deference is 
grounded in the elected branches’ combined powers over immigration, foreign 
affairs (sovereign-to-sovereign dealings),211 and national security.212 The con-
fluence of those powers in a given situation counsels a measure of judicial reti-
cence. 
But where immigration and foreign affairs are not directly involved and 
where the government apparently curtails fundamental liberties on national se-
curity grounds—particularly the liberties of citizens or of noncitizens with con-
nections to the United States213—heightened judicial scrutiny might still be 
 
208. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
209. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
210. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
211. Id. at 2419 (majority opinion) (“‘[J]udicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises con-
cerns for the separation of powers’ by intruding on the President’s constitutional responsibil-
ities in the area of foreign affairs.” (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017))). 
212. Id. at 2420 (“[O]ur inquiry into matters of [immigration] entry and national security is highly 
constrained.”). 
213. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 273 (1990) (finding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to the search and seizure of property “owned by a nonresident alien 
and located in a foreign country,” when the individual “had no voluntary connection with this 
country that might place him among ‘the people’ of the United States”); HIROSHI MOTO-
MURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
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available as an essential aspect of the rule of law.214 As Justice Sotomayor inti-
mated and as ordinary constitutional doctrine prescribes, in that situation, care-
ful scrutiny is designed to protect members of disfavored groups otherwise vul-
nerable to the political will of intemperate majorities.215 This scrutiny is 
especially needed in fear-filled national security settings, as Korematsu demon-
strated, and is jurisprudentially compelling in a democracy marked by checks 
and balances and a separation of powers.216 
Moreover, even where immigration is involved, a foundation for Trump’s ex-
treme judicial deference—the plenary power doctrine—may continue to 
erode.217 Without saying so explicitly, the Court in Trump invoked effectively 
 
UNITED STATES 35-36 (2006). Under the plenary power doctrine, “noncitizens outside the 
United States cannot raise constitutional challenges to exclusion grounds or procedures.” MO-
TOMURA, supra, at 35. But Motomura contends— as Verdugo-Urquidez implies—that “[i]mmi-
gration as affiliation . . . [plays] a central role in the constitutional aspects of immigration 
law” in which “noncitizens with ties in the United States” should be afforded First Amend-
ment protections. Id. at 100, 106. 
214. Courts have undertaken careful scrutiny in this setting. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 536 (2004) (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 725, 727 (1971) (per curiam) (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture . . . . In 
no event may mere conclusions [about national security] be sufficient: for if the Executive 
Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon 
which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary.”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 
263 (1967) (undertaking careful scrutiny and observing that the “Government argues that this 
Court has given broad deference to the exercise of [Congress’s war power] . . . . However, the 
phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of 
congressional power which can be brought within its ambit”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2, 126-27 (1866) (requiring government proof of an “actual and present” public danger 
to justify depriving a citizen of a constitutional right to a civil jury trial through a military trial 
while the civil courts are open and operating); Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 301 
(3d Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that even in national security settings “intentional discrimination 
based on religious affiliation must survive heightened equal-protection review”); Doe v. Gon-
zales, 500 F. Supp. 379, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing the “tragic ill-effects” of the gov-
ernment’s expansive powers “unchecked by judicial rulings” in cases like Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)); cf. YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 77 (noting that some courts 
“demonstrated judicial independence in protecting fundamental civilian liberties during times 
of distress, while still others professed a scrutinizing judicial role before sliding into passiv-
ity”). 
215. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 (1980); YAMAMOTO, supra 
note 4, at 86. 
216. See infra notes 229-243 and accompanying text; see also OWEN FISS, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER: 
THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF TERROR 134-35, 137 (2015); YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 77. 
217. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitu-
tional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1990) (recognizing modern 
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unbridled congressional (and by delegation, presidential) plenary power over 
immigration by citing three older cases embracing that doctrine.218 One of those 
cases, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,219 relied on Korematsu to deferentially uphold 
the national security-justified deportation of a class of legal resident aliens for 
past political associations.220 In dissent, Justice Douglas castigated the majority 
for redeploying an outdated and dangerous doctrine as the basis for unfettered 
deference. He noted: 
This doctrine of [plenary] powers inherent in sovereignty is one both 
indefinite and dangerous . . . . Our [powers] are fixed and bounded by a 
written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent 
powers of a despotism . . . . [The Constitution’s] framers were familiar 
with history, and wisely . . . they gave to this government no general 
power to banish.221 
Indeed, the plenary power doctrine was rooted in nineteenth-century no-
tions of absolute national sovereignty, untethered to contemporary human 
rights commitments.222 Equally significant, the doctrine emerged from racist 
and nativist precepts of America’s need to exclude hordes of threatening foreign-
ers.223 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, Justice Field replicated the California constitutional convention’s narrative 
about an “Oriental invasion.”224 By characterizing the racial group as a “menace 
 
cases’ erosion of the plenary power doctrine); see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that courts should not “‘look behind’ the Govern-
ment’s” order without an “affirmative showing of bad faith”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 695 (2001) (“The Government . . . looks for support to cases holding that Congress has 
‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and that the Judicial Branch must defer to Execu-
tive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area . . . . But that power is subject to im-
portant constitutional limitations.”). 
218. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418-19 (2018) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 
588-89 (1952)). 
219. 342 U.S. 580. 
220. Id. at 589 n.16, 591 n.17. 
221. Id. at 599-600 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
222. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COM-
MENT. 9, 10-11 (1990); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: 
The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14-16 
(2003). 
223. See Saito, supra note 222, at 35 (“The plenary power doctrine was first articulated in the Chi-
nese exclusion cases to allow the government to exclude a disfavored minority . . . by virtue 
of their race, ethnicity, national origin or culture, and to deny them otherwise applicable pro-
tections of law.”). 
224. 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
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to our civilization,” he uplifted unreviewable government power to meet the 
“great danger that at no distant day . . . our country would be overrun by them 
unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.”225 
Over time, judges and scholars have leveled sharp criticism of the plenary 
power doctrine. They have identified the doctrine’s roots in “official racial dis-
crimination,” calling it a “relic from a different era.”226 Moreover, Congress has 
prohibited immigration-visa discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and 
national origin. Changing legislative, judicial, and public views of human rights 
and racism have undercut the doctrine’s reach and standing227—a likely reason 
the Trump majority invoked its tenets without explicitly naming it.  
Cast in this light, a realpolitik opening still exists for limiting the impact of 
Trump and Korematsu.228 
concluding thoughts 
Congress and the President need wide latitude in protecting the nation’s in-
stitutions and people—in securing airports, train stations, public arenas, and nu-
clear power plants; in deploying security forces where needed; in properly gath-
ering intelligence; in vetting newcomers; and in prosecuting violent 
perpetrators. Courts generally should defer in these matters. But not in all situ-
ations.229 
Where the government sweepingly curtails the constitutional liberties of 
those in or with substantial connections to the United States, judicial passivity 
must end. When courts act reflexively as a rubber stamp for executive security 
 
225. Id. (emphasizing congressional power). 
226. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclu-
sion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 
(1957)). 
227. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-41, 2145 (2015) (carefully assessing an official’s visa 
denial for a “bona fide factual basis” and for possible “bad faith” motivation); see also Saito, 
supra note 222, at 32 (“To argue that the U.S. government must have plenary power to protect 
itself from threats posed by [outsiders] is to turn reality on its head. Simply because these 
groups are all perceived as ‘outsiders’ does not mean that they are a threat to . . . national 
security.”). 
228. See Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the 
President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 287 (2005) 
(charting a broad realpolitik blueprint for “building the political coalitions and cultural mo-
mentum needed to impel close judicial scrutiny of executive national security claims” of press-
ing public necessity). 
229. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 95-99 (offering a methodology for determining when height-
ened judicial scrutiny is practically needed and jurisprudentially warranted). 
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actions, they generate a “shadow side” of American law.230 They enable an exec-
utive, with impunity, to scapegoat or intimidate vulnerable groups for political 
advantage. This damages communities, the rule of law, and America’s moral 
stature—whether discriminating on the basis of race or religion,231 locking peo-
ple up indefinitely as “individuals associated with” designated terror groups,232 
torturing to obtain information,233 harassing journalists,234 excluding 
transgender people from military service,235 or gathering broad swaths of citi-
zens’ data without authorization.236 
In these situations, judicial engagement in the form of heightened scrutiny 
stands as an integral pillar in the edifice of a functioning constitutional democ-
racy.237 The “core meaning of ‘civil liberties’ is freedom from coercive or other-
wise intrusive governmental actions designed to secure the nation against real 
or, sometimes, imagined internal and external enemies.”238 Judicial protection 
of these liberties aims to deter or halt “actions [that] may get out of hand, creat-
ing a climate of fear, oppressing the innocent, stifling independent thought, and 
endangering democracy.”239 
For these reasons, Korematsu continues to serve as a cautionary tale about 
enduring tears in the fabric of America’s democracy when courts abdicate their 
role as a guardian of fundamental liberties. And its coram nobis reopening spot-
lights the importance of jurists taking cognizance of powerful political currents 
in halting government excesses and thereby profoundly shaping American jus-
tice—for instance, in Brown (rejecting government racial segregation),240 Ober-
gefell (invalidating bans on same-sex marriage),241 Hamdi (securing judicial re-
view and due process protections for detained citizens labeled “enemy 
 
230. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American Jurisprudence 
Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 49 (2002). 
231. See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015). 
232. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 513 (2004) (quoting Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, 
Joint App. Vol. 1, at 148, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 1120871). 
233. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
234. See Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
235. See Doe v. Trump, 288 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (W.D. Wash. 2017), reconsideration denied, 284 F. Supp. 
3d 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2018), stay pending appeal denied, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2018), 
appeal filed, 2018 WL 1774089 (9th Cir. 2018). 
236. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
237. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 109-20. 
238. POSNER, supra note 141, at 4. 
239. Id. at 4-5. 
240. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
241. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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combatants”),242 and Doe v. Gonzales (rejecting FBI national security letters in 
place of subpoenas for sweeping information gathering from private third par-
ties).243 These cases and others collectively advance an imperative methodology 
for courts, especially in national security and civil liberties controversies that do 
not directly implicate a mix of immigration and foreign affairs: the express re-
pudiation of Korematsu’s “logic” of unconditional deference.244 
There remains a legal opening to meet this imperative. It will entail political 
organizing and education that accentuates lawmaker and judicial accountability 
in a functioning democracy, along with sustained critical legal advocacy that up-
lifts heightened scrutiny as a bedrock for unmasking pretextual government 
abuses. A realpolitik coalescence is essential. Courts acting as guardians of pre-
cious liberties “in practice often results not from legal pronouncements alone but 
rather from a ragged combination of law and politics.”245 This combination likely 
contributed to the lower courts’ preliminary injunctions against the travel 
ban.246 With clear-eyed judges buttressed by vigorous advocacy and organiz-
ing,247 America’s constitutional democracy may yet rise to prevent religious and 
racial animosity from again masquerading behind a facade of national security. 
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242. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
243. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded 
sub nom. John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, 
The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 688 (2016) (“Whether it was 
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245. Id. at 110 (emphasis added). 
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247. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 4, at 111 (emphasizing the need for “‘something more’ to imple-
ment an embraced methodology for better accommodating security and liberty: critical legal 
advocacy and public pressure”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488822 
